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o STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6080 
SEWANHAKA CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, , 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
Certification - C-6080 -2 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. - . 
Included: All regular part-time lunchroom personnel. 
Excluded: Administrative and supervisory personnel and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Untied Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 5, 2012 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6090 
TOWN OF PLATTEKILL, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the. United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described.below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Assessor, Assessor Aide, Building Inspector, Court Clerk, Court 
Officer and Planning & Zoning Clerk. 
Certification - C-6090 
'Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union, the duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does riot compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 5, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowjlz, Chaifpe'rson 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6096 
COMMACK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of theabove-named 
public employer,.in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-6096 - 2 -
Included: Custodian, Driver Messenger, Mechanic's Helper, Groundsperson, 
Lead Groundsperson, Head Custodian, Elementary Custodial -
Worker II, Assistant Head Groundsperson, Custodial Worker II 
(MS, HS), Chief Custodian, Head Custodian, Intermediate HS/MS 
Chief Custodian, Maintenance Mechanic, Head Groundsperson . 
and Storekeeper. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The. duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer i.n good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating anyagreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 5, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkpwjt^, Chairman7 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN F. KENNEDY CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. CE-6107 
LAY FACULTY ASSOCIATION, LIUNA, LOCAL 1255, 
Respondent. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 21, 2011, John F. Kennedy Catholic High School (employer) filed, 
in accordance with the State Employment Relations Act, a timely petition seeking 
decertification of Lay Faculty Association, LIUNA, Local 1255 (respondent) as the 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the employer. 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreements which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
) 
Included: Full and Regular Part-time Lay Faculty Members (including 
librarians and guidance counselors). 
Excluded: All clerical, supervisory and professional and religious employees. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on February 22, 
2012, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the respondent. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
Case No. CE-6107 - 2 -
collective bargaining by the respondent, IT IS ORDERED that the Lay Faculty 
Association, LIUNA, Local 1255 be, and it hereby is, decertified as the negotiating 
agent for the unit. 
DATED: March 5, 2012 
Albany, New York 
'/^^Ml^ 
w 
// Jerome LefkowitzyChairpersjG 
y ~z, Sheila S. Cole, Member 
rutSLIU tlVIKLUYMfcN I K t L A I IUN5 tSUAKU 
In the Matter of 
FRANCIS W. CORCORAN, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5879 
KIPP ACADEMY CHARTER SCHOOL, 
Employer, 
-and- , 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
VEDDER PRICE P.C. (LYLE S. ZUCKERMAN of counsel), for Petitioner 
KEHL, KATZIVE & SIMON,,LLP (SHELLEY SANDERS KEHL of counsel), for 
Employer ^ 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARIA ELENA 
GONZALEZ AND JENNIFER HOGAN of counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on separate exceptions filed by Francis W. 
Corcoran (Corcoran) and by KIPP Academy Charter School (KIPP Academy) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing a petition, as amended, filed 
by Corcoran seeking to decertify the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, American 
Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (UFT) as the collective bargaining representative for 
Case No. C-5879 -2-
employees working for KIPP Academy pursuant to §207 of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act).1 
In dismissing the petition, the ALJ concluded that KIPP Academy is a conversion 
charter school and that the at-issue employees are in the UFT-represented unit of 
employees working for the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of 
New York (District) pursuant to Education Law §2854.3(b) of the New York Charter 
Schools Act of 1998 (Charter Schools Act).2 In addition, the ALJ found that the 
decertification petition filed by Corcoran is not supported by a sufficient showing of 
interest to decertify UFT as the representative of that District-wide unit. Finally, the ALJ 
declined to determine whether KIPP Academy employees should be fragmented from 
the UFT-represented unit because the representation petition did not seek 
fragmentation. ' 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Corcoran contends the ALJ erred in concluding that KIPP 
Academy is a conversion charter school under Education Law §2854.3(b) because it 
was not converted from an "existing public school," which ceased to operate following 
its metamorphosis into a charter school. In addition, Corcoran challenges the ALJ's 
failure to treat KIPP Academy as a separate and distinct negotiation unit pursuant to 
Education Law §2854.3(b). At the same time, Corcoran avers that the Board and the 
ALJ lack authority to interpret Education Law §2854.3(b). Corcoran also asserts that 
1
 43 PERB 1(4022(2010). 
2
 Educ Law S2850. ei sea. 
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the ALJ erred in finding that he did not submit a sufficient showing of interest to decertify 
UFT as the representative of a unit composed of KIPP Academy employees. Finally, 
Corcoran excepts to the ALJ's failure to determine whether the at-issue employees at 
KIPP Academy should be fragmented from the UFT-represented unit. 
In its exceptions, KIPP Academy asserts that the ALJ exceeded this agency's 
jurisdiction by interpreting Education Law §2854.3(b). It claims that the evidence 
presented demonstrates that it is not a conversion charter school under Education Law 
§2854.3(b), and that the at-issue employees are not within the UFT-represented unit of 
District employees. It also contends that the ALJ erred in finding that Corcoran did not 
submit a sufficient showing of interest to decertify UFT, and by failing to rule on the 
issue of fragmentation. 
UFT supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ dismissing the petition, as modified. 
FACTS 
On May 4, 2000, the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York 
(Board of Regents) approved an application by David J. Levin (Levin) for the issuance 
of a conversion charter for KIPP Academy.3 Levin's charter school application was 
3
 UFT Exhibit 2, p. 6. Transcript, pp. 185-187, 197-198. The charter issued by 
the Board of Regents states: "A charter valid for a term of five years, effective 
September 1, 2000, is granted to the KIPP Academy Charter School pursuant to 
Article 56 of the Education Law and in accordance with the attached charter 
agreement dated March 6, 2000 between David J. Levin on behalf of the KIPP 
Academy Charter School and the Chancellor of the Board of Education of the 
Citv of New York and the addenda dated April 13, 2000, April 14, 2000 and April 
Case No. C-5879 -4-
approved by the Board of Regents based upon a favorable April 27, 2000 written 
recommendation from New York State Education Department (SED) Deputy 
Commissioner James A. Kadamus (Kadamus).4 Deputy Commissioner Kadamus's 
recommendation stated that, if approved, KIPP Academy would be a conversion school 
serving grades 5-8 and that it would remain at its current location. 
The recommendation from Kadamus was made after SED reviewed Levin's 
application, as revised, which was transmitted to SED by the District's Chancellor 
(Chancellor) in April 2000. Along with the application, the Chancellor sent the following: 
a letter requesting "that a charter be approved for the conversion of KIPP Academy 
Charter School;" the charter agreement between the Chancellor and KIPP Academy; 
and internal District correspondence concerning the application.5 Prior to Kadamus's 
recommendation and the final action taken by the Board of Regents, Levin was required 
to respond to specific questions and concerns from SED and to submit a revised 
version of the application.6 Levin's original application explicitly sought "the conversion 
of an existing public school to a charter school." SED did not object to the treatment of 
KIPP Academy as an "existing public school" under the Charter Schools Act and it did 
not require Levin to revise the application to indicate that it was seeking a non-
conversion charter. 
4
 UFT Exhibit 2, pp. 10, 12-13, 39-41. 
5
 Joint Exhibit 1, pp. 1 -17; Transcript, p. 197. Joint Exhibit 1 includes three sets of 
documents: Charter and Related Correspondence; KIPP Charter Proposal and 
Application; and KIPP Academy Charter School Proposal Attachments. 
6
 Joint Exhibit 1, pp. 178-186. 
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The correspondence forwarded by the Chancellor to SED with Levin's application 
included a letter from the District's Director of Office of Parent Advocacy & Engagement, 
Michael Carter (Carter), to the District's Supervising Superintendent of Executive and 
New School Development, Dr. Arthur Greenberg (Greenberg), verifying the procedures 
and the results of an election conducted involving parents or guardians of KIPP 
Academy students on October 14, 1999, which approved "converting their school to a 
charter school."7 Greenberg was then in charge of reviewing charter applications for the 
Chancellor.8 The;correspondence sent to SED also included an internal District 
memorandum from Greenberg dated March 6, 2000, regarding Levin's application, 
which states: 
As part of the process of considering applications for the 
conversion of existing Board of.Education schools and 
programs to Charter Status, we ask that superintendents 
consult locally and send us an impact statement. Attached 
is a response from Dr. Vega, Superintendent of Community 
School District 7. While her response raises some issues 
related to the impact of converting KIPP academy to Charter 
Status, we remain in support of the conversion.9 
The KIPP Academy Charter School Proposal included a copy of a June 30, 1999 
District-UFT agreement concerning the contractual rights of UFT-represented 
employees employed in charter schools that were converted under the Charter Schools 
Act. The 1999 District-UFT agreement states that "employees of a Conversion Charter 
7
 Joint Exhbit 1, p. 6. The KIPP Academy Charter School Proposal Attachments includes 
KIPP Academy documentation regarding the October 14, 1999 parent vote approving 
the potential change to charter status. Joint Exhibit 1, pp. 119-125. 
8
 Transcript, pp. 104-105. 
9
 Joint Exhibit 1 n 10 
Case No. C-5879 -6-
School shall be subject to the collective bargaining agreements for like titles or 
positions, in accordance with the Charter Schools Law, including but not limited to 
salary, medical, pension and welfare benefits and applicable due process 
procedures."10 Levin's application, however, includes a document setting forth 
personnel policies for the charter school that refers to annual individual employee 
contracts with guidelines which, if violated, would constitute grounds for discharge.11 
Prior to issuance of the charter by the Board of Regents, Levin was the Director 
of Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP) Academy, which offered enriched college 
preparatory education for students in grades 5-8 in PS 156 in the South Bronx. 
Documentation attached to the application describes KIPP Academy as a "middle 
school,"12 a "middle school program"13 or a "program" at PS 156 aimed at addressing 
that school's Schools under Registration Review (SURR) status.14 It is not disputed that 
KIPP Academy was affiliated with and housed within PS 156, an elementary school 
located in the IS 151 complex along with three other schools, PS 31, PS 168 and IS 
151. Before it became a charter school, KIPP Academy did not maintain a separate 
budget, it did not have a distinct attendance tracking system code, its students and 
personnel were on the PS 156 roster and its teachers were in the UFT-represented 
10
 Joint Exhibit 1, p. 118. 
11
 Joint Exhibit 1, p. 109. 
12
 Joint Exhibit 1, pp. 38-39, 46. 
13
 Joint Exhibit 1, p. 37, 44. 
1 4 l n i n t Fvh ih i f 1 n 1 R 
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unit,15 Since the charter was issued, PS 156 has continued to operate as a public 
school, and KIPP Academy students became students of the.charter school. All the 
teachers hired by KIPP Academy had been District teachers in the UFT-represented 
unit, which is comprised of approximately 75,000 District employees. 
UFT never sought voluntary recognition from KIPP Academy, and UFT has not 
been certified by this agency or recognized by KIPP Academy as the exclusive 
representative of the charter school employees. Nor is there evidence that KIPP 
Academy employees have asked UFT to negotiate with KIPP Academy for 
modifications to the UFT-District collectively negotiated agreement. Many KIPP 
Academy employees continue to pay UFT membership dues through payroll deduction 
and have received benefits through UFT's health and welfare fund. 
During the representation hearing before the ALJ, SED supervisor Dr. Lisa Long 
(Long) testified that it was her understanding that once a public school converts to a 
charter school, the public school ceases to exist.16 Long also stated that SED rejected 
an application submitted by the Chancellor in 2003 or 2004 seeking the conversion of 
the Future Leaders Institute Program to a charter school. According to Long, SED 
required the Chancellor to convert that program into a school and then reapply for a 
charter conversion, which was granted in 2005 or 2006.17 
15Transcript, pp. 68, 75-77, 131-132;Joint Exhibit 1, p. 177. 
16
 Transcript, pp. 228-229.. 
17
 Transcriot. DD. 175-176. 206-207. 223-225. 
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In 2005, the Board of Regents voted to extend the charter granted to KIPP 
Academy until September 1, 2010.18 In 2009, the Board of Regents approved the 
proposed revision of the KIPP Academy charter.19 
DISCUSSION 
A. PERB Has Primary Jurisdiction over Questions of Representation and 
Improper Practices at New York Charter Schools 
We reject the challenge made by Corcoran and KIPP Academy to the authority of 
the Board and the ALJ to interpret Education Law §2854.3(b). Under the Charter 
Schools Act, the Legislature granted us primary jurisdiction to interpret and apply the 
school personnel provisions for New York charter schools, including questions of 
representation, improper practices, reasonable access, employer neutrality and related 
20 
issues. : , -
Education Law §2854.3(a) unambiguously provides that charter schools and their 
employees are covered by the Act. Therefore, we must interpret Education Law 
§§2854.3(b) and (b-1), which codify unique unit placement and representation rights for 
charter school employees. The Legislature mandated in Education Law §2854..3(b) that 
employees of a charter school that was converted from an existing public school, "shall 
be deemed to be included within the negotiating unit containing like titles or positions, if 
18
 Joint Exhibit 3. 
19
 Joint Exhibit 4.. 
20
 Educ Law §2854.3; see also, Brooklyn Excelsior Charter Sch and Buffalo United 
Charter Sch. 44 PERB 1T3001 (2011) (aooeal DendinaV 
o Case No. C-5879 -9-
any, for the school district in which such charter school is located and shall be subject to 
the collective bargaining agreement covering that school district negotiating unit...." 
In addition, when certain statutorily prescribed circumstances are met under 
Education Law §2854.3(b-1), an incumbent employee organization representing similar 
employees in a school district where a non-conversion charter school is located is 
deemed, as a matter of law, to be the representative of "a separate negotiation unit" of 
similar employees working at that charter school.21 However, the employees of a non-
conversion charter school are not subject to the terms of the negotiated agreement for 
the school district employees.22 ^ 
Pursuant to Education Law §§2854.3(c-2) and 2855.1(d), we are granted 
jurisdiction to determine whether a charter school or its agents are violating §209-a.1 of 
the Act. The Legislature has also granted us a preliminary adjudicatory role with 
respect to the revocation of a charter and authorizes us to hear and determine a charge 
alleging that a charter school is engaging in a pattern and practice of violating §209-a.1 
of the Act.23 Education Law §2855. T(d) states that any charter can be revoked or 
terminated: -
When the public employment relations board makes a 
determination that the charter school demonstrates a 
practice and pattern of egregious and intentional violations of 
subdivision one of section two hundred nine-a of the civil 
21
 See, Niagara Charter Sch, 42 PERB P036 (2009). 
22EducLaw§2854.3(b-1)(iv). 
23
 See, NYCTA, 43 PERB P038, n. 9 (2010)(noting that the Charter Schools Act grants 
PERB jurisdiction to hear improper practice charges alleging that a charter school is 
enaaaino in a nattem and nrantine nf vinlatinn SS?09-a Ma\ and (r.\ nf the AntV 
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service law involving interference with or discrimination 
against employee rights under article fourteen of the civil 
service law. (Emphasis added.) 
Finally, we have been granted primary jurisdiction by the Legislature for 
interpreting and applying the unique reasonable access and employer neutrality 
provisions applicable to charter schools under Education Law §§2854.3(c-1) and (c-2). 
Even if the Legislature had not granted us primary jurisdiction over school 
personnel issues under the Charter Schools Act, we are not prohibited from interpreting 
statutes other than the Act. As we noted in Town of Wallkill,24 during the course of 
processing representation petitions and improper practice charges, questions of 
statutory interpretation concerning the Act and related laws are frequently presented. 
While our statutory interpretations may be granted different degrees of deference by the 
courts, depending upon whether it involves interpreting a statutory term of art under the 
Act and the labor relations provisions of related statutes, or it involves discerning 
legislative intent, we are not prohibited from engaging in statutory interpretation. 
Next, we turn to the exceptions challenging the ALJ's conclusion that KIPP 
Academy is a conversion of an existing public school under the Charter Schools Act. 
B. KIPP Academy is a Conversion Charter School 
Although we have primary jurisdiction over the above-referred labor relations 
issues, the Board of Regents has sole authority under the Charter Schools Act to issue 
a charter after reviewing the charter application, the supporting documentation and the 
24
 42 PERB 113017 (2009), pet dismissed, Town of Wallkill v New York State Pub Empl 
Rel Bd. 43 PERB 1T7005 (Sun Ct Albanv Cnuntv 201 DVanrifial nfindinnY 
• Case No. C-5879 -11-
recommendation and approval submitted by the applicable charter entity.25 The charter 
entity, which is the Chancellor in the present case, is solely responsible for approving 
the issuance of a charter after determining that the application meets the criteria set 
forth in. Education Law §2852.2, including that the "charter school described in the 
application meets the requirements set out in this article and all other applicable laws, 
rules and regulations." The Chancellor is not required to approve an application and 
recommend that a charter be issued and may require an applicant to modify or 
supplement an application as a condition of approval.26 Had the Chancellor denied the 
charter conversion application concerning KIPP Academy, the denial would have been 
final and non-reviewable.27 
The Charter Schools Act contains specific references with respect to the 
conversion of an existing school into a charter school. Pursuant to Education Law 
§2851.3(c), the Chancellor is identified as the only charter entity that can receive and 
approve a charter application for the conversion of an existing public school in New 
York City, The Chancellor, however, can not approve such an application unless it is 
supported by a majority of the parents or guardians of the at-issue students as 
demonstrated by the results of an election: ' . , 
(c) The board of regents 
The board of regents shall be the only entity authorized to 
issue a charter pursuant to this article. Notwithstanding any 
25
 Educ Law §§202, 2851.3 and 2852.5-a. 
26
 Educ Law §2852.3. ^ 
27
 F H u r I a\A/ R9R^9 R 
,/ 
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provision of this subdivision to the contrary, an application 
for the conversion of an existing public school to a charter 
school shall be submitted to, and may only be approved by, 
the charter entity set forth in paragraph (a) of this 
subdivision. Any such application for conversion shall be 
consistent with this section, and the charter entity shall 
require that parents or guardians of a majority of the 
students then enrolled in the existing public school vote in 
favor of converting the school to a charter school. (Emphasis 
added) 
The approval of a conversion application by the Chancellor, and the subsequent 
grant of a charter by the Board of Regents, has specific legal implications under the 
Charter Schools Act. The conversion charter is exempted from the limit on the total 
number of charters that may be issued, as set by the Legislature in Education Law 
§2852.9. Also, the employees of a conversion charter school are subject to the unique 
representation and unit placement provisions set forth in Education Law §2854.3(b). 
Under Education Law §§2851 (c) and 2852.2(a), the Board of Regents and the 
Chancellor have been granted the regulatory responsibility for ensuring that an 
application for "conversion from an existing public school" in New York City to a charter 
school meets the applicable standards for conversion. The Charter Schools Act grants 
the Board of Regents and the Chancellor broad discretion in choosing the applicable 
standards for determining.what is an eligible "existing public school" for conversion. 
Their discretion is in contrast to the statutorily defined six factors that must be applied 
when they are determining "whether an application involves the conversion of an 
existing private school."28 
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The record in the present case demonstrates that the Board of Regents issued a 
charter to KIPP Academy Charter School converting KIPP Academy to a charter school 
based upon the recommendation of SED staff. It is reasonable to conclude that SED's 
recommendation was based upon a finding that KIPP Academy satisfied the requisite 
standards for being an "existing public school" for such conversion. The charter was 
issued following SED's review of the application, the supporting documentation 
forwarded by the Chancellor along with the Chancellor's approval, which all treated the 
application as seeking a conversion from an "existing public school." Notably, the 
issuance of the conversion charter to KIPP Academy freed the Board of Regents to 
issue at least one additional charter because a conversion charter is exempted from the. 
legislatively imposed cap set by Education Law §2852.9. 
Throughout the review and approval process, the Chancellor treated Levin's 
application as one seeking to convert KIPP Academy from an existing public school to a 
charter school. Prior to approving the application, the procedures and results of the 
election conducted among KIPP Academy parents and guardians pursuant to Education 
Law §2851.3(c) were verified by District staff. Such an election among parents and 
guardians is required under the°Charter Schools Act only for an application that seeks 
conversion of an existing public school to a charter school. In addition, the 
correspondence and memoranda from the Chancellor and Supervising Superintendent 
of Executive and New School Development Greenberg repeatedly described the 
application as one seeking conversion of KIPP Academy to a charter school. Indeed, 
the Chancellor's written approval of the application sent to the Board of Regents refers 
Case No. C-5879 -14-
Based upon the foregoing acts of the Board of Regents, SED, and the 
Chancellor, we conclude that approval of the charter application and the issuance of the 
charter to KIPP Academy constituted the conversion pf KIPP Academy from an "existing 
public school" to a charter school under the Charter Schools Act. The content of the 
approved application, and the documents supporting issuance, demonstrate that the 
Board of Regents, SED and the Chancellor found that KIPP Academy met the 
prerequisite of being an "existing public school" for a conversion. Otherwise, the charter 
application would have been denied by the Chancellor pursuant to Education Law 
§2852.6, SED would have required Levin to submit a revised application for a non-
conversion charter, or the Board of Regents would have denied issuance of the charter. 
Finally, we reject the efforts by Corcoran and KIPP Academy to collaterally attack 
the actions by the Board of Regents and the Chancellor in approving the application to 
convert KIPP Academy from an existing public school to a charter school, and in issuing 
a charter pursuant to that approved conversion application. Those administrative 
actions are immune from collateral attack because the Board of Regents and the 
Chancellor acted well within their authority and jurisdiction under the Charter Schools 
Act to regulate the issuance of a charter on an application to convert an existing public 
school.29 
Alternatively, we find that the evidence cited by Corcoran and KIPP Academy is 
insufficient to undermine the administrative actions taken by the Board of Regents and 
the Chancellor. SED supervisor Long's understanding that an existing public school 
29
 New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd v Bd of Ed of the City of Buffalo, 39 NY2d 86, 9 
PERB 117004 ngye1): Fov v Schechter. 1 NY2d '604 (1956V 
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must cease to operate following a charter conversion is unpersuasive and is not binding 
upon the Board of Regents, the Chancellor or this agency. In addition, that KIPP 
Academy did not maintain a distinct budget, attendance tracking system code, or 
student and personnel rosters, does not persuade us that KIPP Academy is ineligible to 
be an "existing public school" for purposes of the Charter Schools Act. There is nothing 
in the Charter Schools Act, its legislative history or applicable regulations to 
demonstrate that the Legislature intended the Board of Regents, SED and the 
Chancellor to consider those factors when determining whether an entity is an "existing 
public school" for purposes of a conversion. 
Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to make a de novo determination on the issue 
of whether KIPP Academy is an "existing public school" for purposes of the Charter 
Schools Act. The prior findings by the Board of Regents, SED and the Chancellor 
concerning KIPP Academy's eligibility as an "existing public school" for conversion 
under Education Law §2851.3(c) are binding upon us. In light of those findings, we 
affirm the ALJ's conclusion that KIPP Academy is an "existing public school" under 
Education Law §2854.3(b). 
We note, however, that our rejection of the collateral attack on the actions of the 
Board of Regents and the Chancellor does not prevent Corcoran or KIPP Academy 
from seeking revocation of the charter on the ground that it was issued in violation of the 
Charter Schools Act because KIPP Academy was not "an existing public school." 
Whether revocation is appropriate, particularly in light of the 2005 renewal and the 2009 
revision, rests in the judgment of the Board of Regents or the Chancellor. 
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We next turn to the exceptions challenging the ALJ's conclusion that the KIPP 
Academy employees subject to Corcoran's decertification petition are in the UFT-
represented unit of District employees. 
C. The At-lssue Employees Are in the District-Wide Unit Represented by UFT 
Pursuant to Education Law 52854.3(b) 
Pursuant to Education Law §2854.1(a), the provisions of the Charter Schools Act 
have supremacy over all other inconsistent provisions of New York law and regulations, 
including provisions of the Act and our Rules of Procedure (Rules).30 Education Law 
§2854.1(a) states: 
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to the 
extent that any provision of this article is inconsistent with 
any other state or local law, rule or regulation, the provisions 
of this article shall govern and be controlling. 
In Brooklyn Excelsior Charter School and Buffalo United Charter School,31 we 
held that the provisions of the Charter Schools Act supersede our joint public-private 
employer relationship precedent, as well as our authority under §201.6(b) of the Act to 
designate a joint public employer for a charter school, and deprive us of jurisdiction to 
hear applications filed under §201.7(a) of the Act seeking to designate a charter school 
employee as a managerial or confidential employee excluded from coverage under the 
Act. 
30
 See, Brooklyn Excelsior Charter Sch and Buffalo United Charter Sch, supra note 20.. 
See also, International High School v Mills, 276 AD2d 165 (3d D.ept 2000) (Regents 
examination requirement of Charter Schools Act supersedes prior variances granted to 
J a school under,the Twenty-First Century School Act, Educ Law §309-a.). 
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Pursuant to Education Law §2854.3(a), an employee of a charter school is the 
"employee of the education corporation formed to operate the charter school and not an 
employee of the local school district in which the charter school is located." However, . 
Education Law §2854.3(b) creates a unique unit placement rule and mandates certain 
collective bargaining rights for employees of a charter school "that has been converted 
from an existing public school" who are eligible for representation under the Act. 
Education Law §2854.3(b) states: 
The school employees of a charter school that has been 
converted from an existing public school who are eligible for 
representation under article fourteen of the civil service law 
shall be deemed to be included within the negotiating unit 
containing like titles or positions, if any, for the school district 
in which such charter school is located and shall be subject 
to the collective bargaining agreement covering that school 
district negotiating unit; provided, however, that a majority of 
the members of a negotiating unit within a charter school 
may modify, in writing, a collective bargaining agreement for 
the purposes of employment in the charter school with the 
approval of the board of trustees of the charter school. . 
The first clause of Education Law §2854.3(b) appears to be a'clear and 
unambiguous legislative mandate placing employees in a converted charter school in 
the negotiating unit, if any, of similar titles or positions of the school district where the 
charter school is located, and making them subject to the collectively negotiated 
agreement for that school district unit. The second clause of Education Law §2854.3(b), 
however, suggests an ambiguity concerning-the meaning of the first. In the second 
clause, the Legislature grants "a majority of the members of a'negotiating unit within a 
charter school" the right to modify a collective bargaining agreement "for purposes of 
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employment in the charter school" with the approval of the Board of Trustees of the 
charter school. 
A fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that a statute be "construed 
as a whole, and that all parts of an act are to be read and construed together to 
determine the legislative intent."32 In construing a statute, all of its parts must be 
harmonized with each other for purposes of determining legislative intent.33 
Based upon our close textual analysis of the two clauses in Education Law 
§2854.3(b), and our comparison of them with the provisions of Education Law 
§2854.3(b-a), we conclude that the Legislature intended that employees of a converted 
charter school, as a matter of law, are in the applicable district-wide negotiating unit, if 
) • any, and subject to the existing agreement for that unit. At the same time, however, the 
Legislature granted conversion charter school employees the unique right to be 
represented in collective negotiations with the charter school for the purpose of 
modifying the terms of the existing district-wide agreement. Any negotiated 
modifications are subject to approval by a majority of the charter school employees and 
the charter school board of trustees. 
Contrary to the arguments by Corcoran and KIPP Academy, we do not find that 
the second clause trumps the first in Education Law §2854.3(b) by creating a separate 
negotiating unit for conversion charter school employees. Such an interpretation would 
render superfluous the first clause's phrase "shall be deemed to be included within" the 
32
 Statutes, §97; Brooklyn Excelsior Charter Sch and Buffalo United Charter Sch, supra, 
-note 20. 
33
 Statutes S98- Cminfv nf Frie 44 PFRR f[3D?7 ( ? m i V 
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district-wide unit. To harmonize the two clauses, we conclude that the second clause's 
reference to "the members of a negotiating unit within a charter school" is intended only 
to provide conversion charter school employees with the unique standing of a 
subordinate unit to be represented by the incumbent employee, organization in collective 
negotiations to change the terms of an existing district-wide agreement to meet their 
needs, which may be different from others within the district-wide unit. While the 
existence of a subordinate unit for negotiations within an existing larger unit and the 
statutory right to reopen the existing district-wide agreement are inconsistent with the 
Act and our precedent, they are. superseded by the Charter Schools Act.34 
Furthermore, if the Legislature intended that employees of a conversion charter 
school be in a separate bargaining unit from the district-wide unit it would have 
unambiguously "said so"35 as it did in Education Law §2854.3(b-a) concerning 
employees in non-conversion charter schools. Education Law §2854.3(b-a) states, in 
part, that employees of a non-conversion charter school: 
shall not be deemed members of any existing collective 
bargaining unit representing employees of the school district 
in which the charter school is located, and the charter school 
and its employees shall not be subject to any existing 
collective bargaining agreement between the school district 
and its employees. , * .. 
Education Law §2854.3(b-a) also provides that in certain non-conversion charter 
schools with a particular student enrollment: 
34
 Brooklyn Excelsior Charter Sch and Buffalo United Charter Sch, supra, note 20. 
35
 Won/ V n * Ph^r fo r c^f i / loon 1/ Cmf * I K MVQri / i m / f i n / o n - m \ 
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all employees of the school who are eligible for 
representation under article fourteen of the civil service law 
shall be deemed to be represented in a separate negotiating 
unit at the charter school by the same employee 
organization, if any, that represents like employees in the 
school district in which such charter school is located. 
(Emphasis added) 
This provision also mandates that those non-conversion charter school employees 
placed in a "separate negotiating unit" are not subject to: 
any collective bargaining agreement between any public 
school district and its employees....[nor are] the employees 
of such charter school part of any negotiating unit at such 
school district. The charter school may, in its sole discretion, 
choose whether or not to offer the terms of any existing 
collective bargaining to school employees. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the at-issue 
twenty-one employees of the KIPP Academy are, as a matter of law, within the District-
wide unit represented by UFT because that unit includes similar titles or positions. 
D. Corcoran's Decertification Petition Must Be Dismissed 
Pursuant to §201.2(a) of our Rules, although individual employees lack standing 
to file a petition for certification, they may file a petition to decertify an incumbent 
employee organization.36 A decertification petition that is not supported by a showing of 
interest of at least 30% of the members of the existing bargaining unit must be 
dismissed.37 In this case, the relevant bargaining unit is the District-wide unit 
represented by UFT. Corcoran's petition seeks decertification of UFT but it is not 
3b
 Inc Village of Hempstead, 12 PERB 1J3051 (1979). 
37
 Rules, §201.3(d); New York State Div of Housing and Community Renewal, 21 PERB 
113010Y1988): United LPN's. 21 PERB H3004Y1988). 
; 
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supported by 30% of the District-wide unit. Therefore, it was properly dismissed by the 
ALJ.38 
In their exceptions, Corcoran and KIPP Academy contend that the ALJ erred in 
failing to determine whether.the employees of the charter school should be fragmented 
from the District-wide unit represented by UFT. While the notice of conference and 
hearing issued by the ALJ suggests that Corcoran's petition raises an issue of 
fragmentation,39 it is well-settled under our Rules and precedent that individual 
employees lack standing to seek to fragment an existing unit.40 Based upon the 
foregoing, to the extent that Corcoran's petition might be interpreted as seeking a 
fragmented unit,-it must be dismissed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Corcoran's petition to decertify UFT is 
dismissed. 
DATED: March 5, 2012 . 
Albany, New York 
yC/i^ryix^. 
Jerome Lefkowftz, Chairperson 
\8Q^ 
S Sheila S. Cole, Member 
38
 ALJ Exhibit 1. 
39
 ALJ Exhibit 7. 
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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHARLES JOHNSON, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-29471 
- and -
DANSVILLE SUPPORT STAFF ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
- and -
DANSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
PETRALIA, WEBB & O'CONNELL, P.C. (ARNOLD R. PETRALIA, of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (HAROLD EISENSTEIN, 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Dansville Support Staff 
Association (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge filed by Charles Johnson (Johnson), as amended, which 
alleges that the Association violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it withdrew from arbitration a grievance filed by Johnson 
under the collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) between the Dansville Central 
School District (District) and the Association.1 
During the processing of the charge, the District was not made a statutory party 
pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act and it chose not to intervene after being sent a copy of 
the charge.2 The District's attorney appeared and participated, in part, at the hearing 
before the ALJ.3 
Following the hearing, the ALJ found that the Association violated §209-a.2(a) of 
the Act when Association President Janice Vogt (Vogt) withdrew the grievance from 
arbitration. As a remedy, the ALJ ordered the Association to reimburse Johnson for his 
reasonable legal fees and expenses connected with a lawsuit, if any, against the District 
for the remedy sought in his grievance. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Association asserts that the ALJ erred in concluding that it 
violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act by withdrawing Johnson's grievance. The Association 
asserts that the evidence demonstrates that the grievance was withdrawn for legitimate 
reasons: it lacked merit under the terms of the District-Association agreement, it was 
untimely and Johnson was not harmed by the alleged contractual breach. Finally, the 
Association excepts to the ALJ's remedial order. Johnson supports the ALJ's decision. 
Following a request from the Board, Johnson and the Association submitted 
supplemental briefs concerning two issues: -
Whether §209-a.3 of the Act requires that an employer be 
made a party with respect to a charge alleging that an 
employee organization violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act by 
failing to process a grievance alleging that the employer 
breached a collectively negotiated agreement; and 
2
 Section 204.3(g) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) states: A public employer which is 
made a party to an improper practice charge pursuant to section 209-a.3 of the act may 
file responsive pleadings in accordance with subdivisions (a)-(e) of this section. The 
administrative law judge may deem the public employer's failure to file any responsive 
pleading to constitute a waiver of the public employer's right to participate in any 
hearing held on the allegations of impropriety set forth in the charge. 
3
 Transcript, pp. 2, 5, 16, 48. While the District's attorney did not call or question 
Whether the PERB Board has the authority under §213 of 
the Rules of Procedure (Rules) to add the Dansville Central 
School District (District) as a party pursuant to §209-a.3 of 
the Act when considering the exceptions to the decision and 
proposed remedy of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
The District did not respond to the Board's notice offering it an opportunity, to file 
a brief concerning the two issues set forth above. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision concluding that the Association violated §209-
a.2(a) of the Act. In addition, we add the District as a statutory party consistent with 
§209-a.3 of the Act, and modify the remedial.order. 
FACTS 
On November 5, 2008, Association Grievance Committee Chairman Robert F. 
Waltman (Waltman) began processing a class action grievance filed by Johnson. The 
gravamen of the grievance was that the District violated Article 18 of the agreement 
when it appointed Association President Vogt on October 14, 2008 to a newly-created 
monitor position at an hourly rate of $16.00, which was $8.70 above the hourly rate for 
a monitor under the agreement. The grievance alleged that when the District appointed 
other monitors, their hourly rates were set consistent with the contract rate. The 
grievance further alleged that when Johnson was appointed as head mechanic on,July 
1, 2006, his hourly rate was set consistent with the contract rate for that position. As 
remedies, the grievance sought a retroactive increase of $8.70 in Johnson's hourly rate 
of pay from the date of his appointment as head mechanic, and an increase in the 
hourly rate for all other monitors to make their rate equivalent with the rate paid to Vogt. 
In the alternative, the grievance sought to adjust Vogt's salary to be in compliance with 
•^  After the District Director of Transportation denied the grievance at Step 1, 
J . ' . ' 
Association Grievance Chairman Waltman sent a memorandum to the District 
Superintendent informing him that the Association Grievance Committee and Johnson 
wanted the grievance to be heard at Step 2. The Association Grievance Committee is 
comprised of Waltman, Lori Henry (Henry), Cristie Holbrook (Holbrook) and Jeffrey 
Hayes (Hayes). Vogt and NYSUT Labor Relations Specialist Christina Hamrick 
(Hamrick) are not members of the Grievance Committee. 
Following Waltman's presentation of the grievance at Step 2, the District. 
Superintendent issued a decision denying it on the grounds that the agreement does 
not require that all employees start at the hourly rate set by the agreement, and that the 
agreement is silent concerning the hourly rates for employees who transfer within or 
N • between departments. Finally, the Superintendent referenced several District 
) • • 
employees who have been paid at an hourly rate above that set in the agreement. 
On December 16, 2008, the Superintendent met with Waltman and Grievance 
Committee members Henry and Hayes to discuss the pending class action grievance. 
As a result of that meeting, the parties agreed to waive the timeframe for processing the 
grievance to Step 3 to provide an opportunity for the grievance to be amended, and to 
give the parties time to discuss a possible amicable resolution. Thereafter, an 
amendment to the class action grievance was filed, which deleted the explicit reference 
to Vogt but continued to refer to a monitor being appointed to a new position on 
October 14, 2008 at an hourly rate of $16.00. As a remedy, the amended grievance 
sought specific adjustments to Johnson's rate of pay retroactive to his appointment as 
head mechanic. After reviewing the amendment, the Superintendent issued a 
J ' • 
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grievance. 
On February 5, 2009, the Grievance Committee met and discussed the 
grievance. The handwritten minutes from the meeting state that the Grievance 
Committee voted to process the grievance to the Board of Education (Board) at Step 3, 
and "then to arbitration if necessary."4 The minutes also state that the Grievance 
Committee members "all feel [the grievance] needs to be moved forward.5 
The following day, Waltman sent a memorandum to the Board stating, that the 
Grievance Committee and Johnson were dissatisfied with the Step 2 decision and 
requesting a hearing before the Board. After a hearing, the Board issued a Step 3 
decision denying the grievance on the grounds that the contract is silent regarding the 
rate of pay for employees who transfer within the District, and that the District has the 
discretion to set an hourly rate above the contractual minimum for employees who 
transfer to another District position. In addition, the Board concluded.that the grievance 
is untimely. . 
During a telephone conversation on March 11, 2009, Labor Relations Specialist 
Hamrick asked Waltman to mail her documentation concerning the class action 
grievance. On March 13, 2009, Waltman mailed fourteen pages of documents to 
Hamrick's office in Rochester. On the same day, Waltman received a fax from Hamrick 
containing a copy of the demand for arbitration to the American Arbitration Association 
dated March 11, 2009, concerning the class action grievance. 
The arbitration concerning the class action grievance was scheduled for June 16, 
4
 Charging Party, Exhibit 11. All of the Grievance Committee' members present at the 
meeting voted in favor of processing the grievance to arbitration. Member Hayes was 
absent due to an illness. 
2009. On May 12, 2009, following discussions during an executive session of the 
Association Executive Committee meeting, Vogt made the decision to withdraw the 
class action grievance. It is not disputed that no other member of the Executive 
Committee participated in the withdrawal decision. 
In an e-mail dated May 13, 2009, Vogt directed Hamrick to withdraw the 
grievance. In her e-mail, Vogt set forth the reasons for her decision: a) the Grievance 
Committee was unsure if it had all the necessary information and documents, and it 
lacked sufficient time to review the materials; b) Hamrick did not receive the documents 
sent by Waltman regarding the grievance; c) Waltman responded neither to Vogt's April 
2, 2009 letter nor to her voice messages concerning the grievance; d) Vogt scheduled a 
meeting with Waltman and the Grievance Committee for April 29, 2009, which was 
postponed at Waltman's request; e) the grievance is untimely and the terms of the 
agreement do not support the grievance; and f) Hamrick lacked sufficient time to 
prepare for the scheduled arbitration. In her e-mail and during her testimony, Vogt also 
stated that her decision to withdraw was made based upon the recommendation of 
Hamrick. 
During the hearing, Waltman testified that Grievance Committee members had 
all the relevant information and documentation necessary for deciding to pursue the 
grievance. In addition, Waltman testified that he never received Vogt's letter. While in 
the hospital, however, he did learn that Vogt wanted to meet on April 29, 2009 with 
respect to the grievance. Due to his hospitalization, Waltman had another Association 
member attend the meeting. On May 29, 2009, Waltman learned that the class action 
grievance was withdrawn when he received a faxed copy of Vogt's May 13, 2009 e-
mail 
During her testimony, Vogt stated that prior to her decision to withdraw the 
grievance she had had several conversations with unidentified Grievance Committee 
members who expressed unspecified concerns about the grievance. In defending 
against the charge, the Association did not call Hamrick to testify, and failed to offer into 
evidence copies of the District-Association agreement or the applicable contract 
provision6, Vogt's April 2, 2009 letter, and minutes or notes taken during the Executive 
Committee's May 12, 2009 meeting. 
DISCUSSION 
It is well-settled that in order to establish a breach of the duty of fair 
representation, a charging party must.prove that an employee organization acted in a 
manner that was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.7 While an employee 
organization is entitled to a broad range of reasonable discretion under the Act in 
processing a grievance,8 and in determining whether to take that grievance to 
arbitration,9 such discretion is not unlimited. 
There is no objective evidence in the record to support the Association's 
arguments that the grievance was withdrawn because it lacked merit, it was untimely or 
6
 The amended charge and its attachments were made part of the record. ALJ 1, 
Transcript, p. 6. They were received into the record as background information 
concerning the processing of the charge. A grievance procedure attached to the 
pleading might be from the parties' agreement. However, without an evidentiary 
foundation or a stipulation, we cannot be certain, and we will not consider it in 
determining the Association's exceptions. ALJ Exhibit 1; Transcript, p. 6. 
7
 Nassau Comm Coll Federation of Teachers, Local 3150 (Staskowski), .42 PERB 
U3007 (2009). 
8
 Rochester Teachers Assn (Danna), 41 PERB P003 (2008). 
9
 Symanski v East Ramapo Cent Sch Dist, 117 AD2d 18, 19 PERB U7516 (2d Dept 
that Johnson was not harmed by the alleged breach of the agreement. A copy of the 
agreement or its relevant provision was not introduced into evidence, and we find no 
credible evidence that the withdrawal decision was made following a merits-based 
determination by a disinterested Association representative.10 While Vogt claims that 
Hamrick recommended the withdrawal, we draw a negative inference from the 
Association's failure to call Hamrick as a witness.11 
As the ALJ correctly found, Vogt acted arbitrarily and in bad faith when she had 
the grievance withdrawn because Vogt had a vested interest in its outcome. The 
grievance was filed in response to her appointment at an hourly rate, which is more 
than twice the contract rate for her position. While the amended grievance deleted 
Vqgt's name, the evidence presented at the arbitration might have disclosed facts 
concerning her personal interactions with the District that resulted in her particular rate 
of pay.12 The arbitrator may have ordered a remedy adverse to Vogt's personal 
interests if the grievance was sustained. Vogt's bad faith is further supported, by her 
failure to immediately and directly notify Waltman and Johnson, of her decision to 
withdraw the grievance. 
10
 See, DC37 (Blowe and Watson), 42 PERB P008 (2009). 
11
 County of Tioga, 44 PERB P016 (2011). While a pre-hearing letter and its 
attachments from Hamrick to an ALJ were made a part of the hearing record, the 
parties did not stipulate to the truth of their content. ALJ Exhibit 6; Transcript, p. 6. The 
letter and attachments were received into the record as background information 
concerning the processing of the charge. Based upon the lack of an evidentiary 
foundation or a stipulation between the parties concerning the truth and genuineness of 
these documents, we have not considered the content of Hamrick's letter or the content 
of her e-mail to Vogt regarding the grievance, which is attached to the letter. ALJ 
Exhibit 6.. . 
12
 If the District had unilaterally increased Vogt's salary beyond that permitted under the 
During the hearing, Vogt did not provide any justification for her failure to 
voluntarily recuse herself from making the withdrawal decision in light of her self-
interest. Her assertion in the May 13, 2009 e-mail that the Executive Committee was 
unable to make the decision because it lacked sufficient information lacks credibility. 
The decisional authority could have been delegated to another Association officer, or 
the entire Executive Committee, and the relevant documents and information could 
have been turned over to that decision maker. Furthermore, while Vogt claims that the 
grievance was discussed at the Executive Committee's May 12, 2009 meeting, the 
Association did not introduce into evidence the minutes or contemporaneous notes 
taken during the meeting. 
In addition, we affirm the ALJ's discrediting of the reasons given by Vogt in her 
testimony and e-mail for deciding to withdraw the grievance. Credibility determinations 
made by an ALJ are entitled to substantial deference unless there is persuasive 
objective evidence warranting reversal of such findings.13 The pretextual reasons given 
by Vogt for the withdrawal constitute further evidence that she acted arbitrarily and in 
bad faith in violation of the Act.14 
The objective evidence fully supports the ALJ's crediting of Waltman's testimony 
over Vogt's assertion that the Grievance Committee lacked sufficient information, 
documentation and review time with respect to the grievance. During the six months 
the grievance was pending, the Grievance Committee was on record as supporting it. 
Grievance Chairman Waltman and Grievance Committee members Henry and Hayes 
met with the School Superintendent on December 16, 2008, which resulted in a written 
13
 County of Tioga, supra, note 11. 
agreement relating to the continued processing of the grievance. At a February 2009 
meeting, the Grievance Committee voted in favor of processing the grievance to 
arbitration if the Board denied the grievance at Step 3. During the hearing before the 
ALJ, the Association failed to present any credible evidence that Grievance Committee 
members modified their support for proceeding to arbitration. Vogt's inconsistent and 
conclusory testimony concerning purported interactions with unspecified Grievance 
Committee members is not credible. 
The record also fully supports the ALJ's discrediting of Vogt's claims that 
Hamrick did not receive the documents sent by Waltman and that Hamrick did not have 
sufficient time to prepare for the arbitration. Hamrick was not called to testify, and the 
Association did not present any evidence explaining why Hamrick did not contact 
Waltman about the requested documents or seek to adjourn the scheduled arbitration. 
We also affirm the crediting of Waltman's testimony that he did not receive Vogt's letter 
or messages. The Association did not introduce a copy of Vogt's letter and Vogt did not 
testify concerning the details of her alleged phone messages. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the Association 
violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act when the grievance was withdrawn at Vogt's direction.15 
DISTRICT ADDED AS A STATUTORY PARTY 
It is well-settled that the duty of fair representation is encompassed within the 
15
 We reject the Association's argument, in its supplemental brief, that the amended 
charge should be dismissed because the District was not previously made a statutory 
party pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. Section 209-a.3 of the Act obligates that a public 
employer be named as a statutory party when the charge alleges a breach of the duty 
of fair representation in the processing of or failure to process a grievance. The failure 
to do so might impact the remedy for a violation of the duty of fair representation but it 
is not a jurisdictional infirmity requiring dismissal of the charge. Finally, the Association 
legal obligations of an employee organization under §209-a.2(a) of the Act. Therefore, 
an employee organization breaches its duty of fair representation in violation of §209-
a.2(a) of the Act when it fails to process a grievance under a collective bargaining 
agreement based upon an improper motivation.16 
In 1990, the Legislature amended the Act to codify our jurisdiction and existing 
precedent concerning the duty of fair representation.17 The 1990 legislation added 
§209-a.2(c) of the Act, which reiterated that it is an improper practice for an employee 
organization "to breach its duty of fair representation to public employees under this 
article." The wording of §209-a.2(c).of the Act, and its legislative history, demonstrate 
that the Legislature did not intend to eliminate or modify our precedent finding that 
§209-a.2(a) of the Act imposes the duty of fair representation upon an employee 
organization. 
The 1990 legislation did, however, modify the applicable procedure concerning 
an improper practice charge alleging that an employee organization breached its duty of 
fair representation in the processing of a unit member's claim under a negotiated 
contract. Prior to that modification, we lacked authority to impose a contractual remedy 
upon the employer in a duty of fair representation case unless the charging party 
alleged and proved that the employer violated an employee right under §209-a.1 of the 
Act. Instead, when a charging party proved only that the employee organization 
violated its duty of fair representation in processing a grievance under §209-a.2(a) of 
the Act, we ordered the employee organization to reimburse'the charging party for the 
16
 Brighton Transportation Auth (Raz), 10 PERB 1J3090 (1977); Nassau Educ Chapter of 
the Syosset Cent Sch Dist Unit, CSEA, Inc. (Marinoff), 11 PERB P010 (1978). 
•17 . . 
reasonable costs associated with pursuing a breach of contract action against the 
•10 
employer. 
CPLR §217.2(b), which was added by the same 1990 legislation, renders 
ineffectual our former breach of contract remedy. CPLR §217.2(b) mandates that a 
lawsuit against an employer premised upon an employee organization's breach of the 
duty of fair representation be commenced within four months from the time the 
employee knew or should have known of the breach or the date when the employee 
suffered harm. The filing and processing of an improper practice charge pursuant to 
§209-a.2(a) and/or (,c) does not toll the applicable statutes of limitation for a lawsuit 
against an employee organization19 and/or an employer20 based upon a breach of the 
duty of fair representation by the employee organization.21 / 
Section 209-a.3 of the Act was aimed at modifying our agency's procedure by 
mandating that an employer be. named as a statutory party in all duty of fair 
representation cases concerning the processing of contract grievances to ensure that 
we can order a contract-based remedy under §205.5(d) of the Act, thereby replacing 
our remedial approach of ordering an employee organization to fund a charging party's 
18
 State of New York and Local 418, CSEA, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Diaz), 18 PERB H3047 (1985), reversed, on other grounds, sub nom CSEA v New York 
State Pub EmpI Rel Bd and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB U7024 (3d Dept 1987), affd 
on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 (1988). 
19
 CPLR §217.2(a). One of the purposes of the 1990 legislation was to make the 
applicable statutes of limitation for a lawsuit against an employee organization or 
employer concerning the breach of the duty of fair representation to be the same as 
that for an improper practice charge. 
20CPLR§217.2(b). 
In fact, the 1990 legislation evinces a clear intent to limit an employee to only one 
pursuit of a contractual remedy in court against the employer. Section 209-a.3 states: 
The public employer shall be made a party to any charge 
filed under subdivision two of this section which alleges that 
the duly recognized or certified employee organization 
breached its duty of fair representation in the processing of 
or failure to process a claim that the public employer has 
breached its agreement with such employee organization. 
(Emphasis added) 
By its express terms, §209-a.3 of the Act requires the employer to be named as a party 
in "any charge" filed under §209-a.2 of the Act alleging a breach of the duty of fair 
representation involving "the processing of or failure.to process a claim." Notably, this 
legislatively mandated procedure is not limited to charges alleging a violation of §209-
a.2(c) of the Act; it is applicable to a charge "filed under subdivision two of this section." 
In the present case, we conclude that the District should have been made a 
statutory party to the charge because of the statutory mandate of §209-a.3 of the Act. 
Based upon that requirement, our powers under §213.6 of the Rules, and the facts and 
circumstances before us, we hereby add the District as a statutory party. In addition, 
we modify the proposed remedy because an Association-funded breach of contract 
action by Johnson against the District is time-barred pursuant to CPLR §217.2(b). 
Finally, we reject the Association's contention that the addition of the District as a 
statutory party requires reversal of the ALJ's decision and a hew hearing. The record 
demonstrates that the District received a copy of the charge, had an opportunity to 
intervene as a party, and participated to a certain extent in the hearing before the ALJ. 
In addition, the District declined the opportunity to file a brief with the Board concerning 
its status as a statutory party. 
REMEDY 
The purpose of a remedial order is to make a party "whole for the wrong 
sustained by placing them as nearly as possible in the position they would have been in 
had the improper practice not been committed."23 
The record in the present case establishes that the Association failed to engage 
in a merits-based determination of the class action grievance prior to withdrawing it 
from arbitration. To return Johnson to the status quo ante, we direct that the 
Association forthwith conduct a disinterested reconsideration and reevaluation of the 
merits of the grievance without regard to the impact it may have upon Vogt. Following 
that review and reconsideration, the Association shall inform Johnson in writing within 
sixty days either that the Association will prosecute his grievance to arbitration or 
identify the specific contractual and factual bases for its decision not to prosecute his 
claim. 
If the Association decides to proceed with the grievance, the Association and the 
District shall process it to arbitration in accordance with the parties' negotiated 
grievance procedure. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Association shall: 
1. Forthwith conduct a disinterested reconsideration and reevaluation of the 
merits of the class action grievance filed by Charles Johnson without regard to, 
the impact it may have upon Association President Janice Vogt; 
2. Following the review and reconsideration, the Association shall inform 
Johnson in writing within sixty days of receipt of this order whether the 
oo 
3. Association will prosecute the grievance to arbitration and, if not, the 
specific contractual and factual bases for that decision; 
4. Cease and desist from conditioning the prosecution of grievances based 
upon the personal interests of Vogt or other Association officers; 
5. Sign, post and distribute the attached notice in a manner normally used to 
communicate in writing and electronically with unit employees represented by 
the Association. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the Association decides to prosecute the 
grievance, the Association and District shall: 
1. Process the grievance to arbitration in accordance with the parties' 
negotiated grievance procedure, and the Board retains jurisdiction to 
apportion between the Association and the District any damages that may be 
assessed as a result of the arbitration. 
DATED: March 5, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Dansville Central School District (District) 
in the unit represented by the Dansville Support Staff Association (Association), 
that the Association will: 
1. Forthwith conduct a disinterested reconsideration and reevaluation 
of the merits of the class action grievance filed by Charles 
Johnson without regard to the impact it may have upon 
Association President Janice Vogt. 
2. Following the review and reconsideration, the Association shall 
inform Johnson in writing within sixty days whetherthe Association 
will prosecute the grievance to arbitration and, if not, the specific 
contractual and factual bases for that decision. 
r 
3. If the Association decides to prosecute the grievance, the 
Association and the District shall process the grievance to 
arbitration in accordance with the parties' negotiated grievance 
procedure. 
> 
Dated By . . . 
on behalf of Dansville Support Staff Association 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must 
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
In the Matter of 
CHAUTAUQUA LAKE CENTRAL SCHOOL 
TEACHERS'ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, CASE NO. CP-1313 
- and -
CHAUTAUQUA LAKE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
MARGARET KELWASKI, RN and MICHELLE HOLLEY, RN pro se 
JEFFREY G. KEPPEL, for Petitioner 
MICHAEL L. MUNLEY, ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Margaret Kelwaski, RN 
(Kelwaski) and Michelle Holley, RN (Holley) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ),1 granting a representation petition by the Chautauqua Lake Central 
School Teachers' Association (Association), pursuant to §201.2(b) of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), to place the position of registered nurse in a unit of employees of the 
Chautauqua Lake Central School District (District) represented by the Association. 
Pursuant to §213.2 of the Rules, only a party has standing to file exceptions. 
Consistent with §201.2(b) of the Rules, Kelwaski and Holley were not made parties to 
the Association's representation petition and they did not intervene pursuant to §212.1 
of the Rules. Nevertheless, the District argued before the ALJ that the Association's 
petition should be denied because Kelwaski and Holley strongly objected to being 
represented. Based upon the fact that they were not parties before the ALJ, Kelwaski 
and Holley do not have standing to file exceptions to the ALJ's decision. 
Even if Kelwaski and Holley had standing we would deny the exceptions. In 
drafting §207.1 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act), the Legislature did 
not include employee preference as one of the criteria for making a uniting 
determination. Thus, the preferences of Kelwaski and Holley are not relevant in 
determining the Association's unit placement petition.2 In addition, the record does not 
support the factual grounds cited by Kelwaski and Holley for reversing the ALJ's 
decision to place the position in the Association's unit with other professional 
employees. Finally, placement of the position in the unit represented by the Association 
does not deprive them of their right to refrain from joining or participating in the 
Association pursuant to §202 of the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the ALJ and grant the 
representation petition by placing the position of registered nurse in the unit 
represented by the Association. 
DATED: March 5, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowitz/Chairpersq; 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
2
 Unified Court System, 22 PERB P023 (1989), pet dismissed, Crosson v. Newman, 
149 Misc 2d 499, 24 PERB 1J7001 (Sup Ct Albany County 1990), affd, 178 AD2d 719, 
24 PERB 1F7020 (3d Dept 1991). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 
OF MOUNT KISCO, NEW YORK, INC., 
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-28888 
- and -
VILLAGE/TOWN OF MOUNT KISCO, 
Respondent. 
JOHN M: CROTTY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC (CHRISTOPER R. KURTZ 
and TERENCE O'NEIL of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARDDECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Police Benevolent 
Association of Mount Kisco, New York, Inc. (PBA) to a decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dated December 21, 2011, dismissing PBA's charge alleging that the 
Village/Town of Mount Kisco (Village) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when the Village submitted seven disputed demands as part 
of its response to PBA's petition for interest arbitration.1 
For its exceptions, PBA asserts that the ALJ erred in concluding that negotiations 
had not ended when the Village submitted the at-issue demands to PBA, and 
misapplied the decision in Village of Wappingers Falls2 (Wappingers Falls). In the 
1
 44 PERB ^14620(2011). 
240PERBfl3020(2007). 
alternative, PBA urges that Wappingers Falls be reversed. The Village supports the 
ALJ's decision. Based upon our review of the record, and the positions of the parties, 
we affirm the ALJ's decision dismissing PBA's charge. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are fully set forth in the ALJ' s decision. They are repeated 
here only as necessary to address PBA's exceptions. 
On April 30, 2007, formal proposals were exchanged between the parties during 
their initial negotiating session for a successor agreement. During subsequent 
negotiating sessions, however, the parties exchanged off-the-record proposals for 
settlement purposes only. 
Following an impasse in negotiations, a mediator was appointed. The mediator 
conducted a formal mediation session on November 10, 2008. Among those 
representing PBA at the mediation was Anthony Solfaro (Solfaro). The Village's 
representatives included Christopher T. Kurtz (Kurtz) and Terence O'Neil (O'Neil). After 
the mediator met separately with each team, she had a brief discussion with Solfaro, 
Kurtz and O'Neil at the end of the mediation session. During that discussion, Solfaro 
stated that he would be sending Kurtz and O'Neil "in the immediate future" a final "take 
it or leave it" off-the-record PBA proposal aimed at reaching a settlement. No specific 
deadline, however, was set for PBA to make its final "off-the-record" proposal. 
On November 17, 2008, Solfaro sent PBA's written settlement proposal to the 
Village, with a copy to the mediator.3 The proposal did not state that it was PBA's last 
and final offer. During subsequent conversations, Kurtz informed Solfaro that the 
3
 Brief of PBA, p. 2. 
Village was reviewing the proposal, and that the Village might formulate a response. In 
reaction, Solfaro told Kurtz that PBA's offer "was take it or leave it, what's the response 
about?"4 
On December 11, 2008, the Village sent a six-page document containing the 
. seven at-issue demands to. Solfaro and the mediator via e-mail. The document stated 
that it was on-the-record and for mediation. After reading the Village's on-the record 
proposal, Solfaro became quite upset because it was outside the parameters of the 
parties' off-the-record settlement discussions, and because it was on-the-record. He 
telephoned Kurtz to inform him that PBA would be filing a petition for interest arbitration. 
He also spoke with the mediator and sent her another copy of the Village's proposal. 
On December 16, 2008, PBA filed its petition with the Director of Conciliation. As part 
of its response to the petition, the Village included the at-issue demands contained in 
the Village's December 11, 2008 proposal. 
At the conclusion of the hearing before the ALJ, PBA stated: 
Our Charge is tied to the specifics of the demands that have 
been presented, not that the topics were not raised. We will 
stipulate that the subject matter for the topics of these 
demands were raised in negotiations; not, however, these 
particular demands, and that is our objection'. These 
demands were not previously raised, and, therefore, these 
demands are the ones that cannot be arbitrated, not the 
topic.5 
DISCUSSION 
In Wappingers Falls, we held that an employer did not violate §209-a.1 (d) of the 
4
 Transcript, p. 36. 
5
 Transcript, p. 61. 
Act by submitting a proposal to interest arbitration that it first presented during 
mediation because the proposal was reasonably related to the subject matter of the 
negotiations. 
In the present case, we reject PBA's argument that the mediation process ended 
following the close of the formal mediation session on November 10, 2008. The 
conduct of Solfaro and the Village belies PBA's argument. Solfaro submitted PBA's 
proposal to the Village.and the mediator one week following the mediation session. 
The Village's proposal stated that it was for mediation, and it was sent to both PBA and 
the mediator. After becoming upset over the Village's proposal, Solfaro again 
communicated with the mediator, and sent her another copy of the Village's proposal. 
Notably, the petition for interest arbitration was not filed until five days after Solfaro had 
the opportunity to review and react to the Village's proposal. Based upon the totality of 
the circumstances, we conclude the Village's proposal was made prior to the expiration 
of mediation. 
We also reject PBA's contention that the Village's proposal "was wholly unrelated 
to anything that had been discussed during negotiations."6 This argument is 
contradicted by PBA's admission during the hearing that the subject matter of the at-
issue demands was raised during negotiations. In addition, PBA failed to meet its 
burden of proving that the content of PBA's proposal was not reasonably related to the 
subject matter of the negotiations or the discussions during the mediation. This failure 
of proof is due in large measure to the conscious decision by the parties, following the 
6
 Brief of PBA, p. 9. . 
first negotiation session, to characterize their proposals as off-the-record. 
Finally, we are not persuaded by PBA's arguments for the reversal or narrowing 
of our decision in Wappingers Falls. Mediation constitutes a continuation of 
negotiations, during which an appointed third party seeks to assist the parties in 
reaching a voluntary agreement, and the continued exchange of proposals during 
mediation is fully consistent with policies of the Act. Nothing in Wappingers Falls 
prohibited PBA from responding to the Village's on-the-record proposal during the 
mediation process instead of terminating that process through the filing of a petition for 
interest arbitration. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the ALJ and dismiss the 
charge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that PBA's charge is dismissed. 
DATED: March 5, 2012 
Albany, New York 
//yr^d^i 
Jerome Lefkowilz, Chairpefson 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
In the Matter of 
RISCHARD EDWARDS, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-29844 
- and -
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF GREATER 
NEW YORK, LOCAL 100, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
- and -
MANHATTAN AND BRONX SURFACE TRANSIT 
OPERATING AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
RISCHARD EDWARDS, pro se 
POLLY J. HALFKENNEY and RETU SINGLA, ESQS., for Respondent 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, ESQ., GENERAL COUNSEL (JOYCE R. ELLMAN of 
counsel), for Employer 
J 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Rischard Edwards 
(Edwards) to a ruling by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denying Edwards's motion 
to amend his improper practice charge against the Transport Workers Union of Greater 
New York, Local 100, AFL-CIO (TWU) alleging that TWU violated §§209-a.2(a) and (c) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) to add an allegation that the 
Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (MaBSTOA) violated §209-
a.1(g) of the Act. The ALJ denied the motion to amend on the ground that it is untimely 
pursuant to §204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On or about February 23, 2010, Edwards filed a charge alleging that TWU 
violated §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act when it failed to provide him with representation 
during a disciplinary conference conducted by MaBSTOA on December 21, 2009. The 
charge did not allege that MaBSTOA had violated the Act. Pursuant to §209-a.3 of the 
Act, however, MaBSTOA was made a statutory party to the charge. 
On May 24, 2010, during the processing of his charge, Edwards made a motion 
to amend his charge to allege that MaBSTOA violated §209-a.1(g) of the Act when it 
denied him TWU representation during the December 21, 2009 disciplinary 
conference. In a letter decision dated July 14, 2010, the ALJ denied the motion as 
untimely because the proposed amendment set forth a new substantive claim under 
the Act against MaBSTOA. The ALJ reaffirmed her ruling in the decision dismissing 
the charge against TWU following a hearing.1 
DISCUSSION 
In 2007, the Legislature amended the Act by adding §209-a.1(g) to create anew 
improper employer practice, and a related affirmative defense to such a charge, 
concerning the denial of representation during employer questioning of an employee 
who reasonably appears to be the potential subject of disciplinary action at the time of 
questioning. While §209-a.1(g) of the Act "is entitled to a liberal construction with 
respect to the representational rights protected,"2 it does not modify the applicable 
timeframe for filing an improper practice charge. Pursuant to §204.1 (a)(1) of the Rules, 
1
 44 PERB 1J4569, n.2 (2011). 
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a charge must be filed within four months from the date that a charging party has actual 
or constructive knowledge of the conduct that forms the basis for the charge. We apply 
this time period strictly. The pendency of a grievance in arbitration does not toll the 
period for filing a charge.3 
In the present case, Edwards's motion to amend the charge to add a claim that 
MaBSTOA violated §209-a.1(g) of the Act is untimely because it was made over six 
months after the December 21, 2009 disciplinary conference. Contrary to Edwards's 
argument, the pendency of his disciplinary grievance before an arbitrator did not toll his 
time for filing a charge against MaBSTOA. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's ruling denying Edwards's motion 
to amend and affirm her decision to dismiss the charge against TWU. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: March 5,2012 . _ y , 
Albany, New York / / / / / ^ 
Jerome LefkowitzfChairpers- ~' 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
3
 See, Brighton Fire Dist, 10 PERB1J3091 (1977); New York State Thruway Auth, 40 
PFRRTO014 r?nn7Y 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-30339 
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 
Respondent. 
> JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
ROBERT F. MEEHAN, COUNTY ATTORNEY (FREDERICK M. 
SULLIVAN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Following our review of the exceptions by the Westchester County 
Department of Public Safety Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA), and the 
response by the County of Westchester, we affirm the decision by the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conditionally dismissing PBA's charge for the 
reasons set forth in the ALJ's decision1 and based upon our prior decisions 
concerning the same maintenance of standards clause and the grievance 
1
 44 PERB 114563 (2011). 
arbitration procedure in the parties' collectively negotiated agreement 
(agreement).2 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that PBA's exceptions are denied, and 
the charge is conditionally dismissed. 
DATED: March 5, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Jerome LefkowijC Chairpersjs 
J2-
Sheila S. Cole,"Member 
2County of Westchester, 30 PERB H3073 (1997), on remand, 31 PERB 1J4623 
(1998), affd, 32 PERBH3016 (1999), petition dismissed, Westchester County 
Police Officers' Benevolent Assn v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 32 PERB 
117023 (Sup Ct Albany County 1999), revd and remanded, 279 AD2d 847, 34 
PERB H7002 (3d Dept, 2001), Iv denied, 34 PERB H7016 (3d Dept 2001), Iv 
dismissed, 96 NY2d 886, 34 PERB H7033 (2001), 97 NY2d 692, 35 PERB 1J7001 
(2002), on remand, petition dismissed, 34 PERB H7032 (Sup Ct Albany County 
2001), affd, 301 AD2d 850, 36 PERB H7001 (3d Dept 2003); County of 
Westchester, 42 PERB H3027 (2009); County of Westchester, 44 PERB 1J3020 
(2011), petition dismissed, Westchester County Police Officers' Benevolent Assn 
v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 45 PERB ^7003 (Sup Ct Albany County 
2012). See also, RomavRuffo, 92 NY2d 489, 31 PERB H7504 (1998); CSEA v 
New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 213 AD2d 897, 28 PERB H7004 (3d Dept 
1995); Town ofCarmel, 29 PERB H3073 (1996); NYCTA (Bordansky), 4 PERB 
H3031 (1971); City of Buffalo, 4 PERBH3090 (1971). 
